INTRODUCTION

From Guilt to Shame
W HAT is the logic of torture? In an article on prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Mark Danner has shown that the methods used to soften up and interrogate detainees by American military personnel can be traced back to techniques developed by the CIA in the 1960s. The best known manual of such procedures, the CIA's Counterintelligence Interrogation of Resistance Sources, produced in 1963 at the height of the Cold War, states that the purpose of all coercive techniques of interrogation is "to induce regression." The result of external pressures of sufficient intensity is the loss of those defenses "most re cently acquired by civilized man . . . Relatively small degrees of homeostatic de rangement, fatigue, pain, sleep loss, or anxiety may impair these functions." 1 The programmatic manipulation and control of the environment, including the use of blindfolds or hooding, sleep and food deprivation, exposure to intense heat and cold, sensory deprivation, and similar methods, are meant to disorient the pris oner and break down resistance. "Once this disruption is achieved," a later ver sion of the manual observes, the subject's resistance is "seriously impaired." He experiences a "kind of psychological shock" as a result of which he is far more open to suggestion and far likelier to comply with what is asked of him than be fore. Frequently the subject will experience a "feeling of guilt." If the interrogator 3 Contrast this with the implicit logic of torture at Abu Ghraib forty years later. All the methods that have been described in the current scandal are designed to publicly humiliate and shame the prisoner. An American military pamphlet in structing troops on Iraqi sensitivities warns against shaming or humiliating a man in public, since shaming will cause him and his family to be anti-Coalition. Ac cording to the pamphlet, the most important qualifier for all shame is for "a third party to witness the act." It cautions that if an American must do something likely to cause an Iraqi shame, he should "remove the person from the view of others." Acts such as placing hoods over a detainee's head, placing a detainee on the ground, or putting a foot on him should be avoided because they cause Arabs shame. Likewise, the pamphlet says, Iraqis consider a variety of things to be un clean: " 'Feet or soles of feet. Using the bathroom around others. Unlike Marines, who are used to open-air toilets, Arab men will not shower/use the bathroom to gether. Bodily fluids' " ("LT," 72).
As Danner observes, these precepts are emphatically reversed at Abu Ghraib. It is precisely because such methods induce shame that they have been ex ploited there and at other American interrogation sites, where detainees have been kept hooded and bound, made to crawl and grovel on the floor, forced to put shoes in their mouths, and worse. "And in all of this, as the Red Cross report noted, the public nature of the humiliation is absolutely critical: thus the parading of naked bodies, the forced masturbation in front of female soldiers, the con frontation of one naked prisoner with one or more others, the forcing together of naked prisoners in 'human pyramids' " ("LT," 72). The torture carried out at Abu Ghraib almost seems to demand what was counterindicated in 1963, the open use of the camera, because shame depends on the subject's consciousness of exposure. As Danner again notes: "And all of this was made to take place in full view not only of foreigners, men and women, but also of that ultimate third party: the ubiquitous digital camera with its inescapable flash, there to let the detainee know that the humiliation would not stop when the act itself did but would be pre served into the future in a way that the detainee would not be able to control" ("LT," 72). As a "shame multiplier" ("LT," 72) the camera epitomizes the logic of torture at Abu Ghraib, which can be defined as a spectatorial logic of shame. 4 In one sense, the resort to shaming techniques may represent a specific adaptation to the Arab context. But it is also true that the shift from a logic of torture based on guilt to a logic of torture based on shame reflects a more gen eral shift that has taken place in the course of the last forty years from a dis 4 In his exposé of the Abu Ghraib scandal, Seymour Hersh reveals that the public humiliation was part of a deliberate American policy to create an army of Iraqi informants, inserted back in the population, will ing to do anything, including spying on their associates, in order to avoid dissemination of the shameful photos to family and friends. It was not effective, and the insurgency continued to grow. Seymour Hersh, course of guilt to a discourse of shame. It is not just a question of assuming, as anthropologists used to do, that the Iraqis belong to a more primitive "shame culture" than our own Western "guilt culture." Today, shame (and shameless ness) has displaced guilt as a dominant emotional reference in the West as well. A major purpose of my book is to examine and evaluate that displace ment. In his recent study of humiliation and associated emotions, such as shame and embarrassment, William Ian Miller has noted the recent deprecia tion of guilt and resurgence of interest in shame among the self-help and re lated disciplines, but disputes the idea that a major paradigm shift has really occurred. He claims that "the makeover makes shame look not at all unlike guilt." 5 I disagree. For all the interest of his study, Miller fails to see what is orig inal and important about shame theory today, and misconstrues the stakes in volved in the upsurge of books and articles that take shame as their primary point of reference. I argue instead that the change from a culture of guilt to a culture of shame in Western thinking about the emotions is highly significant and has important consequences.
My story begins with the centrality of guilt to post-World War II assessments of survivors of the concentration camps. The terms used in the CIA's 1963 training manual for the interrogation of resistant detainees bear an uncomfortably close proximity to those used by victims and researchers alike in the same postwar pe riod to describe the psychodynamics of the tortured and shocked survivors of the Holocaust. 6 Giorgio Agamben has recently observed in this regard that the sur vivor's feeling of guilt is a locus classicus of the literature on the camps. 7 "That many (including me) experienced 'shame,' that is, a feeling of guilt during the im prisonment and afterward, is an ascertained fact confirmed by numerous testi monies. It is absurd, but it is a fact," Primo Levi observes in his last (and most Warfare, 1945 -1960 (Oxford, 1994 on the government's effort to enlist communication studies to perfect American propaganda and counterinsurgency programs. 5 troubled) book about his time in Auschwitz. 8 Similarly the psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim, who was imprisoned in Dachau and Buchenwald in 1938-39, writes: "One cannot survive the concentration camp without feeling guilty that one was so incredibly lucky when millions perished, many of them in front of one's eyes . . . In the camps one was forced, day after day, for years, to watch the destruction of others, feeling-against one's better judgment-that one should have intervened, feeling guilty for not having done so, and, most of all, feeling guilty for having also felt glad that it was not oneself who perished." 9 Or in the words of Elie Wiesel, cited by Agamben: " 'I live, therefore I am guilty. I am here because a friend, an acquaintance, an unknown person died in my place' " (RA, 89). And in a state ment also cited by Agamben, Ella Lingens asks: " 'Does not each of us who has returned go around with a guilt feeling, feelings which our executioners rarely feel-'I live, because others died in my place?' " (RA, 89).
In attempts during the 1960s to explain the phenomenon of survivor guilt, American psychoanalysts such as William Niederland, Henry Krystal, Bettelheim, and others borrowed from the work of Freud, Sandor Ferenczi, and Anna Freud in theorizing that the guilt feelings associated with survival were the result of an unconscious imitation of, or identification with, the aggressor. They argued that the humiliated prisoner, in the moment of shock, regressively defends against the persecutor's violence by unconsciously yielding to, or imitatively incorporating, the violent other. And since under camp conditions of abject powerlessness the incorporated aggression cannot be projected onto the aggressor, the violence is turned back against the victim, who experiences it in the form of a self-lacerating conscience. In short, from the start the notion of survivor guilt was closely con nected to the theme of imitative identification and to the idea of the victim's de fensive, unconscious bond of collusion with the situation of terror. In his highly in fluential discussion of the "gray zone," where "the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge" (DS, 42), Primo Levi-no admirer of psy choanalysis-likewise explored the question of the unconscious identification, "mimesis," or imitation of the aggressor that complicitously binds the victim to the violence directed against himself (DS, 48).
But it is precisely because of the taint of collusion associated with the notion of survivor guilt that almost from the start objections have been raised against it. To take one influential example, Terrence Des Pres, in his widely admired book The Survivor (1976), repudiated both the notion of identification with the aggressor and that of survivor guilt, emphasizing instead the role played in the victim's sur vival by social bonding, mutual care, and outright resistance. According to Des Pres, if imitation of the SS took place in the camps, as Bettelheim and others 
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claimed, the imitation was not an unconscious, collusive identification with the enemy but merely a strategic mimicry undertaken consciously by political prison ers in order to obtain positions of power and to assist other victims in the struggle for life. 10 A similar repudiation of the notion of unconscious imitation and survivor guilt marks the more recent literature on trauma. In 1980, when the diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was introduced into the American Psychi atric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III), survivor guilt feelings were regarded as a characteristic symptom of the disor der and were included in the list of diagnostic criteria. 11 But in the revised edition of the manual of 1987 (DSM-IIIR), the American Psychiatric Association after con siderable controversy downgraded survivor guilt to the status of an "associated" and noncriterial feature of the condition. 12 As we shall see, now that survivor guilt has disappeared from the official list of criteria for PTSD, shame has come to take its place as the emotion that for many investigators most defines the condition of posttraumatic stress.
In a similar movement, literary critic Lawrence Langer, known for his analyses of Holocaust video testimony, has rejected the notion of survivor guilt, not only because he thinks it deflects blame from the real culprits onto the victims them selves, but more generally because it belongs to what he regards as a normaliz ing, therapeutic, redemptive approach to the misery of the Holocaust that es tranges us from the ultimately incomprehensible and unredeemable reality of the camps. This leads him to call for a post-Holocaust revision of ethics that would go beyond the dilemmas and contradictions posed by the unheroic "choiceless choices" that ruled the victims of the Nazis. 13 Although it is not clear what Langer thinks an alternative, post-Holocaust ethics might look like, he hints at one direc tion to follow when he suggests that "shame" might be a better word than the troubling concept of "guilt" for the anguish experienced by the survivor. Embrac ing a distinction between guilt and shame that Primo Levi himself does not ob serve, Langer states that Levi did not enjoy using a word like "guilt" when raising 7 the problematic topic of collaboration. In the end, he claims, Levi preferred to speak of "shame" as the "primary legacy of the moral swamp into which German coercion had sunk its prey." 14 Agamben makes a similar gesture when he criti cizes the notion of survivor guilt and rejects as "puerile" Levi's self-reproaches for minor wrongs committed by him during his time in the camps. Agamben sug gests that the reader's supposed unease with Levi's writings on this topic can only be a reflection of the survivor's embarrassment at being unable to master shame (RA, 88). Agamben's larger claim, which goes far beyond Langer, is that the concentration camps were nothing less than an "absolute situation" that re vealed shame to be "truly something like the hidden structure of all subjectivity and consciousness" (RA, 128).
Although Langer and Agamben represent different approaches to the Holo caust and stand for different ideas about shame, the general privilege they accord to shame over guilt can be situated in the context of a broad shift that has re cently occurred in the medical and psychiatric sciences, literary criticism, and even philosophy away from the "moral" concept of guilt in favor of the ethically different or "freer" concept of shame. Today's "vogue of shame," to use Christo pher Lasch's phrase, is manifest not only in the work of the American Psychiatric Association and books by Langer and Agamben. 15 Shame (1987) by Donald L. Nathanson, Tomkins' best-known follower in the psychotherapeutic domain. Each of these works-and there are many oth ers-posits a clear differentiation between guilt and shame in order to make use of shame theory for various philosophical, postpsychoanalytic, postmodernist, and political projects and critiques. It is a measure of how much has changed that the author of a recent biography of Bruno Bettelheim, one of the architects in the United States of the postwar concept of survivor guilt, treats Bettelheim's deeply covered-over feelings of shame, not guilt, as the key to the self-doubt and sense of fraudulence that haunted him throughout his life and career. 16 The original intuition informing the present book was that the current tendency to privilege shame over guilt could at least partly be understood in terms of the perennial conflict between the "mimetic" and "antimimetic" tendencies internal to trauma theory, as those terms are defined and tracked historically in my Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) . 17 In that book I argued that from the moment of its invention in the late-nineteenth century, the concept of trauma has been fundamentally un stable, balancing uneasily, or veering uncontrollably, between two antithetical poles or theories. The first, or mimetic theory, holds that trauma, or the experi ence of the traumatized subject, can be understood as involving a kind of hyp notic imitation of or regressive identification with the original traumatogenic per son, scene, or event, with the result that the subject is fated to act it out or in other ways imitate it. Trauma is understood as an experience of violence that im merses the victim in the scene so profoundly that it precludes the kind of specu lar distance necessary for cognitive knowledge of what has happened. The mimetic theory explains the tendency of traumatized people to compulsively re peat their violent experiences in nightmares or repetitive forms of acting out by comparing the traumatic repetition to hypnotic imitation. Trauma is therefore in terpreted as an experience of hypnotic imitation and identification that disables the victim's perceptual and cognitive apparatus to such an extent that the experi ence never becomes part of the ordinary memory system. This means that the amnesia held to be typical of psychical shock is explained as a kind of posthyp notic forgetting.
An aspect of the mimetic theory that should be stressed-and indeed is fea tured in the CIA's discussion of the resistant source's identification with the inter rogator-is that mimesis or unconscious imitation leads to doubts about the ve racity of the subject's testimony, since the identificatory process is thought to take place outside of, or dissociated from, ordinary awareness. Because the victim or detainee is imagined as thrust into a state of suggestive-hypnotic imitation, the 9 mimetic theory cannot help worrying about confabulation, or the problem of testi monial authenticity. Finally, since the mimetic theory posits a moment of terrorized identification with the aggressor, prisoners are imagined as incorporating and therefore complicitously sharing the hostility directed toward themselves. The concept of survivor guilt finds its explanation in the mimetic theory by assuming that the identification is always ambivalent because structured by hate and love and hence is inherently rivalrous and guilty.
The second, or antimimetic theory, also tends to make imitative identification basic to the traumatic experience, but it understands imitation differently. The mimetic notion that victims of trauma are completely caught up or blindly im mersed in the scene of shock is repudiated in favor of the opposite idea that the subject remains aloof from the traumatic experience, in the sense that he remains a spectator of the scene, which he can therefore see and represent to himself. The result is a tendency to relegate the problem of mimesis to a secondary posi tion in order to establish a strict dichotomy between the autonomous subject and the external event. The antimimetic theory is compatible with, and often gives way to, the idea that trauma is a purely external event that befalls a fully consti tuted if passive subject. Whatever damage there may be to the victim's psychical integrity, there is in principle no problem about his eventually recovering from the trauma, though the process of bringing this about may be long and arduous. And in contrast to the mimetic theory's assumption of an unconscious identification with the aggressor, the antimimetic theory depicts violence as simply an assault from without. This has the advantage of portraying the victim of terror as in no way mimetically collusive with the violence directed against him, even as the ab sence of hypnotic complication as regards the reliability of his testimony shores up the notion of the unproblematic actuality of the traumatic event.
Des Pres's claim that if the victims of the camps did imitate the SS, they did so only for strategic purposes and always maintained an inner resistance to, or spectatorial distance from, the scene in question conforms to the antimimetic model of trauma. The antimimetic theory also lends itself to various positivistic in terpretations of trauma epitomized by the neurobiological theories that have won widespread acceptance today. The American Psychiatric Association's decision in 1987 to remove survivor guilt from the criteria of PTSD may therefore be seen as exemplifying the antimimetic tendency of contemporary American psychiatry to suppress any reference to the mimetic dimension and to enforce instead a strict dichotomy between the autonomous subject and the external trauma. The framers of the definition of PTSD aimed at precisely such a dichotomy for forensic reasons: the division justified the claims of the anti-Vietnam war movement that veterans were suffering from combat-related psychiatric disorders against skep tics who doubted the need for a new diagnostic category. The PTSD committee of DSM-III tried to guarantee that strict dichotomy between subject and event by carefully defining the "stressor criterion." 18 Is it possible that today's shame theory reflects a similar antimimetic tendency? In my book on trauma, I argued that from the end of the nineteenth century to the present there has been a continual oscillation between mimetic and antimimetic theories, indeed that the interpenetration of one by the other, or alternatively the collapse of one into the other, has been recurrent and unstoppable. Put slightly differently, my claim was that the concept of trauma has been structured histori cally in such a way as simultaneously to invite resolution in favor of one pole or the other of the mimetic-antimimetic oscillation and to resist and ultimately defeat all such attempts at resolution. The wager of the present study is that recent ef forts to displace the concept of survivor guilt by that of shame may be under stood as yet another manifestation of the fluctuation or tension between the mimetic and the antimimetic paradigms that has structured the genealogy of trauma from the start.
In this book I therefore plan to show that the concept of survivor guilt is insepa rable from the notion of the subject's unconscious identification with the other. Conversely, I seek to demonstrate that, in spite of the apparent diversity of ap proaches proffered by today's theorists, shame theory conforms to the an timimetic pole of trauma theory because it displaces attention from the guilty sub ject's unconscious yielding to the enemy to the shamed subject's antimimetic consciousness of being seen. As a result, shame theory downplays the mimetic immersive, interpersonal dynamic central to the formulation of guilt in order to de pict shame as an experience of consciousness of the self when the individual be comes aware of being exposed to the diminishing or disapproving gaze of another. In other words, shame enacts a shift from the mimetic to the antimimetic by emphasizing the realm of the specular.
This, however, is not to say that the tension or oscillation between mimesis and antimimesis at work in the guilt-shame debate can be resolved into a simple op position between a guilt concept governed exclusively and unproblematically by mimetic assumptions and a shame concept governed solely by antimimetic pre suppositions. It has been my argument all along that the oscillation between mimetic and antimimetic tendencies in trauma theory can never be fully resolved. Accordingly, we would expect those same tensions to surface within the theoriz ing of guilt itself, just as we would expect them to manifest themselves in the con ceptualization of shame. Thus I shall show that the psychoanalytic explanation of survivor guilt is marked by aporias and inconsistencies that can best be under stood as a legacy of unresolved and unresolvable tensions within the theorization of imitation defined simultaneously in mimetic and antimimetic terms. And we shall see that contemporary shame theory, which emphasizes the antimimetic pole of the mimetic-antimimetic oscillation, struggles to maintain a coherent antimimetic position. Nevertheless, I claim that the tension between mimesis and an timimesis that is internal to the conceptualization of both survivor guilt and shame does play out over time in the form of a general shift from a conceptualization of survivor guilt, understood in mimetic terms as involving the subject's unconscious identification with the other, to a conceptualization of shame that transforms pas sionate identifications into identity and in so doing posits a rigid dichotomy and specular distance between the autonomous subject and the external other. Ac cordingly, in this book I shall generally be less interested in tracking the inevitable mimetic-antimimetic tensions that arise within the discourses of guilt and shame than in charting the general shift from guilt to shame.
Moreover, I aim to demonstrate that whereas in the past the theorization of survivor guilt remained within an intentionalist or cognitivist paradigm of the emo tions, current shame theory shares the positivist ambitions of the medical sci ences by theorizing shame in antiintentionalist (or anticognitivist) terms. By com mon agreement, guilt concerns your actions, that is, what you do-or what you wish or fantasize you have done, since according to Freud the unconscious does not distinguish between the intention and the deed, the virtual and the actual. Equating intention with the deed, psychoanalysis maintains the link to intention and action that is held to be intrinsic to the notion of guilt. 19 Shame, however, is held to concern not your actions but who you are, that is, your deficiencies and inadequacies as a person as these are revealed to the shaming gaze of the other, a shift of focus from actions to the self that makes the question of personal iden tity of paramount importance. (It makes no difference to my argument in this re gard whether the self is considered a unified, fixed essence or identity or whether, 19 My claim in Trauma that, according to Freud's theorization of mimesis, a fundamental tendency to ward primary identification precedes and gives rise to desire for an object, does not undo intentionalism. It only undoes a version of intentionalism that accords primordiality to a notion of desire as bound in some essential way to desired objects before some mediator-father, mother, teacher, friend-intervenes to tell what is desirable. If desire is mimetic before it is anything else, this means that it is first mobilized by an identificatory "model" to which it conforms. Thus the child in the famous "fort-da" game discussed by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is not (or not only) playing at losing an object of enjoyment when he throws away the spool but is playing at being his mother, and in so doing is identifying with her. On these points see Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford, Calif., 1988), 26-48.
after Freud, Lacan, or deconstruction, the self is regarded in antiessentialist terms as fragmentary, destabilized, and unfixed.)
Accompanying such a shift of focus to the self, and as an alternative to an in tentionalist account of the emotions, many of today's theorists define the affects, including shame, in materialist terms. According to them, shame is the result of inherited, neurophysiological responses of the body that are held to be independ ent of our intentions and wishes. As I showed in Trauma, these same materialist (or literalist) assumptions govern modern trauma theory as well, so that shame theory and trauma theory here overlap. In the works on shame I shall be dis cussing, the turn to materialism is partly a function of a general displacement of psychoanalysis by postpsychoanalytic and/or biological-evolutionary approaches to the study of human behavior. That displacement has been going on now for more than twenty years and amounts to a major conceptual and methodological paradigm shift. But even in the work of Agamben, for whom the theory of evolu tion is irrelevant, we find a similar materialist, antiintentionalist approach to shame. The general result is an account of shame that makes questions of agency, intention, and meaning beside the point and privileges instead issues of personal identity and difference.
The success of current shame theory, as I see it, can be explained by its ability to support and reinforce a self-declared postmodernist and posthistoricist com mitment to replacing disputes or disagreements about intentions and meaning with an emphasis on who one is, or differences in personal experience. This de velopment is as much a historical phenomenon as it is a theoretical one, and ac cordingly I conceive of my enterprise as a contribution to our understanding of that history. My book is not intended as a comprehensive study of the vicissi tudes of guilt and shame in Western thought. 20 Rather, it is presented as a contri bution to the understanding of the changing fortunes of survivor guilt and shame from the post-World War II period to the present. It is an effort to take a step back from the routine, almost somnambulistic way in which notions of shame have re cently come to dominate discussions of trauma, violence, and the self in order to examine, in the mode of what might be called a "genealogy of the present," the steps by which the shift from guilt to shame has come about.
Some further remarks are in order. Since four of the five chapters of my book chart responses to survivors of trauma, including centrally survivors of the Holo caust, there is a clear sense in which my book can be understood as a contribu tion to the field of Holocaust and trauma studies. However, my goal is broader than that. By aiming to grasp the significance of the replacement of postwar no tions of guilt by those of shame, my narrative as it unfolds simultaneously loosens 13 the connection to trauma as such-since the most influential writings on shame that I discuss in chapter 4 have little to do with questions of trauma-and ex pands the scope of the argument. In particular, my objective is to show that with few exceptions all the recent shame theorists I discuss, whether they are inter ested in trauma or not, are alike bound to a set of linked commitments-to antiin tentionalism, materialism, and the primacy of personal identity or difference-that decisively alters the terms of the analysis. For what I have come to see is that the conflict between the mimetic and the antimimetic with which I began this project is part of a larger set of oppositions-between intentionalism or cognitivism ver sus antiintentionalism or anticognitivism, between antimaterialism versus materi alism, and between identification versus identity-at work in general questions of interpretation today. What is new is my claim that there is a particular logic at work in the shift from guilt to shame, a logic according to which if you think that the emotions, including shame, are to be understood in nonintentionalist terms, then you are also committed to the idea that they are to be defined in material terms, indeed that they are a matter of personal differences such that what is im portant is not what you have done, or imagined you have done, but who you are. It seems to me that this logic, pervasive in emotion theory today, is unsoundempirically unsound, because as I shall try to show, the experimental evidence does not support a coherent antiintentionalist position, and theoretically unsound, because it means giving up disagreement about intention and meaning in favor of an interest in simply what an individual person experiences or feels, that is, in fa vor of questions of personal identity.
My book is not intended as an exhaustive study of psychiatric or institutional responses to survivors of the Holocaust, or as a detailed examination of German reparation law, or as a comprehensive history of psychotherapeutic approaches to the survivor, or as a thorough examination of laboratory experiments that touch on the question of shame, although it engages with aspects of all these topics. It is rather a work of intellectual history in which I focus in a systematic fashion on the shift from guilt to shame that has taken place in the United States in the post-World War II period in an attempt to evaluate the stakes of that change, a change amounting to a major paradigm change in concepts of affect, self, and personal agency.
My study is divided into five chapters. In chapter 1, "Survivor Guilt," I trace the post-Holocaust development of the concept of survivor guilt. I pay special atten tion to the contributions of those psychoanalysts who, encouraged by West Ger many's new reparation laws, which recognized emotional disability as a basis for a compensation claim, tried to help victims of the Nazis make claims for restitu tion by establishing a "survivor syndrome" diagnosis that linked the victim's char acteristic symptoms of persistent depression and guilt-ridden anxiety to his or her disastrous experiences during the war. In the course of my analysis I note that many of the figures I discuss, including Primo Levi, do not make a clear distinc tion between guilt and shame, treating the latter as a variant of the former-the present tendency to treat guilt and shame in binary terms is a recent develop ment (I myself do not believe that these emotions are necessarily mutually exclu sive). I also discuss some of the difficulties those same analysts experienced in theorizing survivor guilt coherently in mimetic-identificatory terms. I suggest that revisionist modifications in the Freudian approach to the traumatized subject in troduced by Robert Jay Lifton, a psychiatrist recognized for his 1968 study of survivors of Hiroshima, disarticulated the concept of survivor guilt from that of identification with the aggressor in such a way that the connection between guilt and aggression was dissolved or at least attenuated and more traditional notions of individual responsibility and consciousness began to take over. I show that Lifton's ideas about guilt were taken up by critics who were opposed to the whole idea of a "survivor syndrome," with the result that his ideas were soon put to uses that were fundamentally hostile to the psychoanalytic enterprise.
Chapter 2, "Dismantling Survivor Guilt," centers on critiques of the concept of survivor guilt by Terrence Des Pres and others in the political context of the post war controversy launched in the 1960s by Hannah Arendt and others over the question of Jewish "complicity" in the Holocaust. In his book The Survivor (1976), Des Pres claimed that the notion of survivor guilt ended up blaming camp prison ers because it implied they were collusive with perpetrator violence. Instead, Des Pres proposed a sociobiological definition of survivors as ethical and caring per sons who, thanks to their biological endowment, had emerged from the camps with their integrity and minds intact. His critique belongs to that general move ment in the human sciences in America that during the 1970s and 1980s dis placed psychoanalysis from its previous position of importance. In particular, Des Pres crystallized a tendency in the wake of the Eichmann trial to question the au thority of the Freudians to give a just portrait of the survivor. At the center of Des Pres's attack on the notion of survivor guilt was his account of survivors as pris oners who, if they were obliged to imitate the enemy for self-protection, did so not in the mode of an unconscious identification with the aggressor but in the mode of a conscious mimicry that concealed the victims' true wishes and feel ings. Des Pres's recasting of imitation in antimimetic terms as deliberate simula tion permitted a reevaluation of survivors not as neurotic or ill but as capable of resisting power by performatively disguising their true intentions. At the same time, by reinterpreting survival in terms of a biological "talent for life," Des Pres treated the human being's capacity for intentions as a function of his or her bio logical-corporeal endowment-in other words, he interpreted survival in material ist terms. Des Pres made use of Erving Goffman's dramaturgical ideas to support his arguments. Similar approaches to imitation governed sociological and psy choanalytic critiques of the notion of survivor guilt in the 1970s and 1980s. Shame is not yet the dominant motif of the works I examine in this chapter, but the account of survival and the self that they offer helped set the stage for shame theory's rise to influence.
In chapter 3, "Image and Trauma," I turn to the American Psychiatric Associa tion's decision in 1987 to drop survivor guilt as one of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The third, 1980 edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnos tic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III), which officially introduced the diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), represented a revolution in the approach of American and hence worldwide psychiatry. Psychoanalytic norms that for thirty years or more had dominated the field were abandoned in favor of a more posi tivist and ostensibly atheoretical description and classification of mental disor ders. The introduction of PTSD stimulated a large number of research projects designed to further clarify and operationalize the disorder. In this chapter I explore the importance of the concept of the traumatic "image" to the ongoing process of reformulation. In particular, I argue that the reconceptualization of PTSD in the 1980s around the traumatic image, defined as an externally caused mental con tent or "icon" uncontaminated by any mimetic, fictive, or fantasmatic dimension, made the notion of survivor guilt, which depended for its rationale on a now-dis credited Freudian theory of identification with the aggressor, an incoherent ele ment in the theory of posttraumatic stress, so that its elimination from those crite ria made sense. This doesn't mean that the notion of survivor guilt completely disappeared from the ordinary or daily language of trauma, only that within psy chiatry it now lacked any obvious theoretical justification. I therefore link the de mise of survivor guilt in trauma theory to the coalescence of the question of trau matic violence around the concept of image. I shall focus on the work of several trauma theorists, including Mardi J. Horowitz, whose use of stress-inducing films to operationalize and objectivize trauma contributed to the formulation of post traumatic stress. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the ways in which shame has come to take the place of survivor guilt in recent discussions of PTSD.
In chapter 4, "Shame Now," I examine a variety of recent texts on shame in or der to exhibit and critically assess the fundamental logic of shame theory today. In the course of my discussion I shall take into account a wide range of psychologi cal, biological, and literary-critical works. I shall pay special attention to the postmodernist, postpsychoanalytic writings of literary critic Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in my view the most brilliant and articulate of recent shame theorists. Sedgwick is indebted to the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who proposed an "affect program theory" of the emotions that defined the affects, including shame, in bio logical, antiintentionalist terms. Although Sedgwick presents the intentionalist or cognitivist theory of the emotions as the entrenched position she wants to chal lenge, I see things rather differently. In fact, the opposite seems to me true: ver sions of Tomkins's "affect program theory"-especially those associated with the
